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We undertake a quantitative analysis of the dispersion of current accounts in an
open economy version of incomplete insurance model, incorporating important market
frictions in trade and ¯nancial °ows. Calibrated with conventional parameter values,
the stochastic stationary equilibrium of the model with limited borrowing can account
for about two-thirds of the global dispersion of current accounts. The easing of ¯nan-
cial frictions can explain nearly all changes in the current account dispersion in the
past four decades whereas the easing of trade frictions has almost no impact on the
current account dispersion.
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Large current account imbalances often become a source of concern, especially when they
are large de¯cits. The large current account de¯cit of the U.S. since 2002 has generated
much debate on its causes and the need for eventual adjustment.1 And indeed in many
other countries, large current account de¯cits have often preceded an external crisis, thus
stoking fears of an impending gloom when they appear on the balance of payments accounts
of emerging markets.
In contrast to this common view that regards large imbalances as a cause for concern,
others see a sign of progress in large current account imbalances. Some interpreted the U.S.
current account de¯cit as an outgrowth of an integrated ¯nancial market resided by high-
saving countries|e.g. savings glut view by Bernanke (2006). In this vein, large current
account imbalances are a welcome development to the extent they are outcomes of a rising
global economic integration (in ¯nancial and trade accounts).2
Both views have merits and are fundamentally interrelated, with one point of contact
being the global dispersion of current account balances. Potentially consistent with the latter
view, the past several decades have seen a rising dispersion of current accounts among a large
group of countries as well as a subgroup of advanced economies. It suggests that, as economic
integration progresses, countries ¯nd it easier to lend and borrow, thereby generating a larger
dispersion of current accounts.3 The analysis so far, however, has been largely empirical and
somewhat indirect, not least owing to the paucity of a theoretical analysis of the global
distribution of current accounts, with Clarida (1990) marking the most recent analysis.4
We investigate quantitatively the distribution of current accounts and other external
balances in a stochastic multi-country model where each country adjusts its consumption
and external assets in response to idiosyncratic shocks to its income, subject to frictions in
trade and ¯nancial accounts. The model enables us to study the determination and evolution
1See Obstfeld and Rogo® (2005), Engel and Rogers (2006), and Caballero and others (2008) on di®erent
views on the matter.
2This view is closely related to the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) puzzle, which implies that observed current
account imbalances are too small to be the results of a fully integrated world ¯nancial market.
3See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) for consistent evidence and interpretation for the euro area's devel-
opments, and Faruquee and Lee (2008) for evidence with a larger group of countries. Both papers will be
further discussed in the next section.
4As related developments, Bai and Zhang (2008) and Castro (2005) develop quantitative models of global
equilibrium, but do not focus on the distribution of current accounts or its evolution over time.
1of the world distribution of current accounts, and its response to changes in frictions in goods
and ¯nancial markets. The comparison of the e®ects of frictions in goods and ¯nancial
markets is motivated by the apparent decline in trade costs over time as well as the thesis
of Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) that trade costs can be the main driver of several anomalies
in international economics.
Our model is an open-economy version of the incomplete insurance model of Bewley
(1986), Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1995), and captures precautionary and self-insurance
considerations that underlie lending, borrowing, and consumption decisions in the presence of
liquidity constraint. The world economy comprises a continuum of countries, each of which is
populated by a representative household endowed with a stochastic income. Countries engage
in goods trade subject to an iceberg cost of trade, and have access to the world capital market
that is incomplete and subject to several frictions. Calibrated with conventional parameter
values, the model accounts for about two-thirds of the global dispersion of current accounts.
We also ¯nd that the easing of ¯nancial frictions has a greater e®ect on the dispersion of
current accounts than the easing of trade frictions. Finally, we examine the implications
on several stylized facts, including the persistence of current accounts and international risk
sharing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents strong trends in global disper-
sion of current accounts, net foreign assets, and trade balances in the past four decades,
and Section 3 lays out our benchmark model of world economy where countries engage in
international trade and ¯nancial transactions subject to frictions. In Section 4, we calibrate
the model economy and match the observed pattern of international trade and ¯nance (e.g.,
average import-GDP ratio and net foreign asset distribution) for year 2000, in the face of
stochastic relative income shocks which are estimated from the de-trended GDP data of
80 countries over 40 years. We then ask whether decrease in frictions can account for the
observed trends in current accounts of Section 2, as well as exploring the implications on
several stylized facts about current accounts. Section 5 concludes.
22. Global Dispersion of Current Accounts
The dispersion of current account balances has been increasing over the past several decades.
Figure 1 shows, for each year from 1960 to 2004, the 80-percent range that comprises the
current account in percent of GDP except for the top and bottom deciles (thus from 10 to 90
percent, when ranked numerically). The top panel illustrates the near doubling in the width
of the 80-percent range of current account balances. For example, between 1970 and 2004
the cross-sectional standard deviation of current account balance to GDP ratio increased
from 4.9% to 6.9% (Table 1). This upper panel is based on the sample that rose from 70
countries in 1970 to about 120 countries in 2004 (after having started with 50 countries in
1960). The same pattern is seen in the bottom panel that is based on the advanced-country
sample that started with 18 countries in 1960 and 1970, adding three countries to comprise
21 countries in 2004. The 80-percent range has widened visibly in this graph as well, where
the particularly rapid widening in recent years would re°ect the deepening of global current
account imbalances.
A similar widening in global dispersion is found for net foreign asset positions and trade
balances, both measured in percent of GDP. Figures 2 and 3 show the 80-percent range for
net foreign assets and trade balances, both for the larger sample of about 120 countries as
of 2004 and for the more balanced sample of about 20 advanced countries. The dispersion
of net foreign assets has increased rather dramatically, more than the dispersion in both
current accounts and trade balances.5 For example, between 1970 and 2000, the cross-
sectional standard deviation of net foreign asset to GDP ratio increased from 29.3% to
55.4% in Table 1. The dispersion in trade balances has increased also, though somewhat less
than the dispersion in net foreign assets or current accounts. Between 1970 and 2000, the
cross-sectional standard deviation of trade balance to GDP ratio has increased from 9.8% to
11.6%.
The rising dispersion of current accounts over the past several decades has been high-
lighted in several earlier papers. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) documented the rising
dispersion of current accounts in European countries, and associated it with the improving
5In both current account and net foreign assets, the impressive rise in the gross positions has been well
documented, including in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for gross external asset and liability positions, and
numerous references that documented the rise in exports and imports.
3¯nancial integration, including the launch of the euro area. Faruqee and Lee (2008) examined
a sample of nearly 100 countries and found an underlying trend-increase in the dispersion of
current accounts. They also found evidence in support of ¯nancial integration as the main
contributing factor to the rising dispersion, while ¯nding little support for trade openness as
a contributing factor.
Over a longer haul, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) have reported the evolution in the dis-
persion of current accounts since the late-1800s. They attribute this centurial movement to
underlying ¯nancial integration, intertwined with the trilemma of international economics.
In particular, they ¯nd the standard deviation of current accounts among 15 sample coun-
tries was highest in the early 1900s (prior to the First World War), which they view to have
been a period of a highly integrated world capital market, comparable to the 2000s.6
3. Theory
3.1. Motivation
We undertake a quantitative theoretical analysis of the dispersion of current accounts, in-
corporating several important frictions. A theory of distribution requires us to go beyond a
typical two-country framework to a multi-country model. We turn to the incomplete insur-
ance model with multiple (in¯nitely many) agents that originated with Bewley (1980) which
was further developed by Clarida (1990) in international context and by Aiyagari (1994) and
Huggett (1995) in domestic context among others. Faced with incomplete insurance and a
limit to borrowing, each country (agent) accumulates assets as a way of self-insurance, in the
face of idiosyncratic shocks to its income. In equilibrium, a stationary distribution emerges
for endogenous variables including current accounts.
This model captures important precautionary and self-insurance motives behind lending,
borrowing, and consumption decisions which arise in the presence of liquidity constraint,
although the liquidity constraint itself is not derived from ¯rst principles (the same interpre-
tation as in just cited papers).7 Because countries are limited in the amount they can borrow
6For interest rate spread-based evidence on the high international integration of capital markets in the
pre-war period, see Mauro and others (2006).
7For papers that focus on modeling liquidity constraints in two-country settings, see Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) or Mendoza, Quadrini, and R¶ ³os-Rull (2008).
4in certain states of nature, they accumulate assets as a precaution against such events. This
precautionary motive does not require and is independent of the convexity of marginal util-
ity that is postulated as the basis of precautionary savings in small open-economy models
(Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) and references therein).
One innovation of our model, compared with the conventional incomplete insurance
model, is the introduction of the spread between the lending and borrowing interest rates
which we interpret to re°ect the cost of ¯nancial intermediation. This spread in interest
rates, discourages countries from borrowing too frequently and reinforces their incentive to
accumulate assets for self-insurance in the face of borrowing constraints. As a result, the
spread plays an important role in matching the shape of the stationary distribution of net
foreign assets and current accounts (more details in Section 4).
Besides constructing the most compact model of dispersion, the modeling choice is mo-
tivated by the debate on incomplete risk sharing in the international economics literature.
Financial market frictions have been viewed as a primary cause of several well-known phe-
nomena of incomplete risk sharing across countries, including low international correlation
of consumption and home bias in international equity allocation. More recently, phenome-
nal accumulation of international reserves in emerging markets has been attributed to self-
insurance motive, in the absence of fully developed market for insurance.8
Compared with the earlier works by Clarida (1990), our model forms the basis of a
quantitative analysis of the global dispersion of current accounts. We also focus on the e®ect
of various frictions on the global dispersion of current accounts, where relative income shocks
are the only source of heterogeneity. Clarida (1990) had explored the current account level
e®ects of high and low levels of discount rates, in qualitative terms. Without focusing on the
evolution of the current account dispersion, two recent papers have developed quantitative
models of global equilibrium that build up on Clarida's work. Castro (2005) investigates
whether technological shocks can explain income dispersions, and Bai and Zhang (2008)
explore the role of ¯nancial frictions in explaining the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Of course,
these papers share the characteristic that the stationary distribution of current accounts is
invariant to the initial asset holdings and endowments.
8See Caballero and Panageas (2007), Lee (2008), and Obstfeld and others (2008).
53.2. Model
We study a world economy with continuum (measure one) of countries. Each country is
populated by a representative household who faces a stochastic endowment xt which is
assumed to vary exogenously according to a stochastic process with a transition probability
distribution function ¼x(x0jx) = Pr(xt+1 · x0jxt = x) over support [x; ¹ x]. There is no global
(world-wide) uncertainty. Countries have access to a world capital market where they trade
one-period consumption loans, and can borrow up to a certain limit.

















at+1 = xt ¡ cdt ¡ (1 + ¿)cft + (1 + r)at:
The net holdings of foreign claims is denoted by at. A country faces an exogenously imposed
borrowing constraint, ¹ a, which is set at a level larger than the natural limit, ¡x=rB. We
assume that there is a spread between the lending rate (rL) and borrowing rate (rB) so that
rL < rB: that is, r = rL when at > 0 and r = rB otherwise. This spread in interest rates,
re°ecting the cost of ¯nancial intermediation, reinforces a country's incentive to accumulate
assets for self-insurance in the face of borrowing constraints (more in Section 4).
A country would like to consume both domestic- and foreign-produced goods. The do-
mestic consumption cdt is constrained by its endowment xt (cdt · xt). The consumption of
foreign goods cft requires an import cost denoted by ¿ (the familiar iceberg cost of trade,
re°ecting a transportation cost or trade restrictions). For simplicity, we assume that both
domestic and foreign goods are treated identically in the world goods market (thus the rel-
ative price of foreign goods in the domestic market is just 1 + ¿ always and everywhere). A
country's trade balance tbt and current account cat are then:
tbt = xt ¡ cdt ¡ (1 + ¿)cft;





































0 = x ¡ cd ¡ (1 + ¿)cf + (1 + r
L)a; if a ¸ 0;
a
0 = x ¡ cd ¡ (1 + ¿)cf + (1 + r
B)a; if a < 0;
a
0 ¸ ¹ a:
Each country's optimal decision rules for consumptions and asset holdings can be derived
as functions of two state variables a and x: cd(a;x), cf(a;x), a0(a;x), under a given set of
interest rates rL and rB. The competitive equilibrium for the world economy consists of
these decision rules for consumptions and asset holdings, interest rates, and the invariant
distribution ¹(a;x)9 that satisfy the following conditions.
1. Individual countries optimize:
Given rB and rL, the individual country's decision rules cd(a;x), cf(a;x) and a0(a;x)
solve the optimization problem in (1).




d¹ = (1 + ¿)
Z
cf(a;x)d¹


















9Let A and X denote sets of all possible realizations of a and x, respectively. The distribution is ¹(a;x)
is the probability measure de¯ned over the ¾-algebra of A £ X.
7Each country's optimal decision rules and the market clearing condition in goods and
capital markets are the same as in any equilibrium model. A distinguishing point is the
fourth condition on the time-invariant measure, the equilibrium distribution of net foreign
assets that is endogenously determined in our model. Combining the equilibrium distribution
¹(a;x) with other optimal decision rules, we can derive the global (equilibrium) distribution
of other endogenous variables, including the current account and trade balance.
4. Quantitative Analysis
4.1. Calibration
We brie°y explain the choice of the model parameters. The unit of time is a year. We
assume that the log of a country's endowment (relative income shock) x follows an AR(1)
process: lnx0 = ½x lnx + "x, where "x » N(0;¾2
x). We estimate ½x and ¾x by estimating the
AR(1) process of linearly de-trended log per capita GDP of 80 countries for the period of
1961-2003 from the Penn World Table version 6 (PWTv6). The regression includes annual
time dummies and country dummies to control for, respectively, global shocks and country
¯xed e®ects.10
^ yt =0:863 ^ yt¡1 + et; ^ ¾e = 0:0493 ¹ R
2 = 0:81:
where ^ yt is linearly de-trended log per capita GDP at time t. The estimate for the persistence
is 0.863 (with t-ratio of 57) and the standard error of regression is 0.0493. We set ½x = 0:863
and ¾x = 0:0493.
The relative risk aversion (°) is 2, and the discount factor (¯) is 0.96, following the
standard practice in the literature. Following Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000), the elasticity of
substitution between consumptions of domestic and foreign goods (´) is 6. According to
Anderson and van Wincoop's (2004) survey article, trade costs (inclusive of tari® and other
factors) is estimated at 48-63%. We set ¿ = 0:5. Given ¿ and ´, we set the relative weight
on domestic goods in the CES utility function (Á = 0:475) to match the average ratio of
expenditures on domestic to foreign goods, 4.2 in Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000).11 With these
10Since we de-trend each country's log per capita GDP by the country-speci¯c linear trend which is
compatible with the observed speed of long-term growth of each country, the remaining idiosyncratic shocks
are largely orthogonal to the long-term dynamics of economic growth and income convergence.
11The share of home traded goods in total trade goods is 0.5 (Stockman and Tesar, 1995) and 0.72 (Corsetti
8values the model generates the average import-GDP ratio of 19% in the steady state, close
to the level touted in the literature (also close to what we observe in 2000).
For the benchmark economy, we assume that the interest rate spread Ã = rB¡rL is 1:5%
based on the 1{3% range of the historical spread between borrowing and lending rates in the
U.S., which would form the lower end of the spread between lending and borrowing rates
faced by many other countries.12 Finally, we set the borrowing limit ¹ a = ¡1:5 (implying that
a country can borrow from abroad up to 150% of its average GDP) at the lower bound of the
NFA-to-GDP ratios of advanced economies in 2000.13 Table 2 summarizes the parameters.
4.2. Benchmark Economy
We ¯nd the equilibrium interest rate ~ r (rB = ~ r + 0:5Ã and rL = ~ r ¡ 0:5Ã) and invariant
distribution of ¹(a;x) that clears the world capital market. The market clearing rate ~ r is
4:06%, implying the lending rate of 3.3% and the borrowing rate of 4.8%.
Figure 4 shows the stationary distribution of probability density, import-GDP ratios,
trade balances, and current account balances of the model. International trade balance and
current account positions conform with the precautionary savings motive. Looking at the
second row of the ¯gure, in times of a higher income, countries choose to increase their
savings, and thus current and trade account balances increase (surplus). As a larger share
of income is set aside for savings, imports decline slightly as a share of income. For a given
level of income, countries with higher asset holdings can a®ord a higher level of consumption,
showing de¯cits in trade balance and current account.
et al., 2008), and the share of non-traded goods is usually put at 0.5 in the literature (an exception being 0.45
used by Corsetti et al.). The ratio of domestic to foreign expenditure will be 0:75
0:25 = 3 (combining Stockman
and Tesar with the usual ratio between tradable goods and non-tradable goods), or 1¡0:55£0:28
0:55£0:28 = 5:5 (Corsetti
et. al), with the Obstfeld-Rogo® (2000) number of 4.2 in the middle.
12We calculated the U.S. spread as the di®erence between bank prime loan rates and 6-month CD rates,
obtained from FRB website. Bank prime loan rates are majority prime rate charged by banks on short-term
loans to business, and was thus compared to 6-month CD rates which we viewed to have risk and maturity
pro¯les comparable to those of bank prime loans. Between 1981 and 2007, this spread ranged from a low of
1.2% in 1987 to a high of 3.25% in 2001, with the average at 2.37%. We choose a value on the lower half of
this interval as a measure of the cost of ¯nancial intermediation, akin to trade costs. Spreads in international
lending (e.g. sovereign spreads on emerging markets) are often much larger, but a signi¯cant part of it is
attributed to risk premium rather than the cost of ¯nancial intermediation. And refer to Homer and Sylla
(1991) for historical data on spreads.
13The smallest NFA-to-GDP ratio was 1.49 for the advanced-economy sample, and the ratios were smaller
in preceding years. The value 1.5 corresponds to 98% lower bound of the NFA-to-GDP ratio of the whole
sample including developing countries, which re°ect non-market-based ¯nancing in highly indebted countries.
9Figure 5 exhibits the histogram of current accounts, trade balances and net foreign assets,
implied by the stationary distribution. Current accounts and trade balances are distributed
mostly within the range of 20 percent of GDP on both sides (most of them falling between
-10% and 10% of GDP). Net foreign assets, on the other hand, are distributed over a much
wider range stretching from -200% to 200%, with the bulk of the mass concentrated between
-100% and 100%. Note that net foreign assets smaller than -150% of GDP corresponds to
the times when the income is smaller than the average income level relative to which the
borrowing limit is set (at -150%).
The existence of a spread between borrowing and lending rates plays an important role
in reducing both the spike on the left-to-center of the current account distribution and the
fat right tail of the net foreign asset distribution. Without a spread, the net foreign asset
exhibits an extremely skewed distribution, with a thick concentration of densities on the
borrowing side. And the current account distribution exhibits a spike on the borrowing side
(i.e. to the left of the center). Under the spread between borrowing and lending interest
rates, the borrowing becomes more costly and lending becomes less pro¯table, and countries
refrain from borrowing frequently and instead accumulate more assets for self-insurance.
This reduces the spike in current account distribution (which corresponded to a small current
account de¯cit occurring frequently), as well as reducing the extreme skewness of the net
foreign assets distribution. The resulting distributions of the current account and net foreign
assets come much closer the shape of actual distribution of net foreign assets and current
accounts.
The global dispersion of external balances obtained from the benchmark model is com-
parable to the actual 2000 data.14 Under the benchmark model, the standard deviation of
the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP is 55 percent in Table 3, equal to the 2000 value of
the standard deviation in data. The standard deviation of the current account is 5 percent,
slightly more than 2/3 of the actual 2000 value, and that of the trade balance is about 1/2
of the actual 2000 value. The relatively small dispersion of trade balance in the benchmark
model is probably due to the absence of °uctuations in the terms of trade, which would add
14The choice of 2000 as the benchmark comparator re°ects the subsequent swelling of global current ac-
count imbalances which some view as having been associated with the build-up of global ¯nancial imbalances,
and also partly the availability of consistent data in the published version of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
paper.
10to the dispersion in trade balance by increasing the variation in the value of trade balance
for a given movement in trade volume.
Using parameter values that are consistent with the data and literature, we have been able
to account for the bulk of the global dispersion in current accounts and net foreign assets
around 2000. The primary source of dispersion is the heterogeneity in income, measured
relative to each country's trend growth, implying that the insurance motive alone has the
potential to account for a large part of the dispersion in current accounts, subject to a widely
accepted degree of frictions in the °ow of goods and ¯nance.
4.3. Economies under Greater Frictions
Returning to the rising dispersion in current accounts discussed in Section 2, we ask what
factors lie behind the rise in dispersion between 1970 and 2000.15 We do it in reverse, by
considering three cases with greater frictions (namely tighter constraints) in the economy.
We ¯rst consider goods market frictions, by increasing the trade cost (¿) to 0.7, which
lowers the average import-GDP ratio from 19% to 10%. This decline is consistent with
the observed change in import-GDP ratio between 2000 and 1970 (assuming intermediate
imports to be about a half of gross imports, or to remain a constant percent of gross imports).
According to column (4) of Table 3, the change in the trade cost brings about little change in
the dispersion of external balances, however. While the shares of both exports and imports
decrease, there is little change in the standard deviation of current accounts, net foreign
assets, and trade balances because the trade cost a®ects exports as well as imports.
We then consider capital market frictions, in two separate directions. The borrowing
constraint is tightened to ¹ a = ¡0:5 from ¡1:5 of the benchmark model,16 and the interest
rate spread is increased to Ã = 3% (close to the upper end of historical interest rate spread
for the U.S. discussed in Section 4.1) from 1:5% of the benchmark model. In both cases,
the dispersion of external balances falls by a large margin that is almost comparable to the
change in data between 1970 and 2000. Under our parameter choices, the decline is starker
15We choose 1970 because the sample size is substantial by that time, and because the world economy had
moved su±ciently close to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime that regulated international capital
°ows much more tightly than later (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004).
16For the 1970 data, the smallest NFA-to-GDP ratio was 0.35 for advanced-economy sample, and the value
0.5 corresponds to the 90% lower bound of the NFA-to-GDP ratio of the whole sample including developing
countries.
11when the spread is increased than when the borrowing limit is tightened, but there is no
direct comparing the severity of two types of capital market frictions.
According to the data, the dispersion of net foreign assets in 1970 (29.3%) is about 53%
of that in 2000 (55.4%). The dispersion of current accounts in 1970 (4.9%) is about 70%
of that in 2000 (6.8%). According to the model, with a tighter borrowing constraint, the
dispersions of net foreign assets and current accounts decrease by 38% (from 55.4 to 34.4%)
and 20% (from 5 to 4%), respectively (Table 3 Column (5)). With a larger spread (3%)
between borrowing and lending rates (Column (6)), the dispersion of net foreign asset falls
more dramatically. It decreases by 55% (from 55.4 to 25%). As a result, the dispersion of
current account decreases by 37% (from 5% to 3.3%), more than the change in the data.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of current account balances for each model speci¯cations:
benchmark, a larger trade frictions (¿ = 0:7), a tighter borrowing constraint (¹ a = ¡0:5), and
a larger spread (Ã = 3%). The change in the cost and availability of borrowing and lending
is found to have a direct and visible e®ect on the consumption/saving decision. In contrast,
trade frictions appear to have the primary e®ect on the intra-temporal choice between home
and foreign-good consumptions, while having only a secondary e®ect on the inter-temporal
choice between consumption and saving. These results are consistent with existing papers
(discussed in Section 2), in that the international ¯nancial integration has likely been the
leitmotif behind the increase in the dispersion of current accounts.
The limited role of trade costs contrasts with Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) proposal that
trade costs could be the main driver of the spread between lending and borrowing rates,
especially when the spread has a signi¯cant in°uence on the current account dispersion in
our model. This contrast stems from the fact that our model does not allow the \reversal"
of imports that is critical to generating the interest rate spread in the Obstfeld and Rogo®
analysis. If a country imports home-producible goods when income and savings are high,
at a price higher than the price at which the country will export the same goods when
its income is low, then the country's real interest rate on lending can be lower than its
real interest rate on borrowing. While the reversal of imports (importing a good in one
period and exporting it in another period) is critical for this channel, our model precludes
this channel by construction. More important, the data suggests that countries are not
likely to experience such reversal of imports at a large scale, corroborated in our own model
12calibration by the limited size of idiosyncratic shocks which is smaller than the share of
imported goods. Despite this contrast, our model is in partial agreement with the Obstfeld
and Rogo® analysis, in indicating that the spread between lending and borrowing rates has
a powerful e®ect on international °ows of ¯nance.
4.4. Comparing Stylized Facts among Model Economies
We now compare our model economies, those with di®erent ¯nancial market frictions, in
terms of several well-known stylized facts that have implications on academic and policy
research. We ¯rst generate simulated panel data (500 countries for 1000 years) on the basis
of the equilibrium distributions of di®erent model economies, and then estimate several
stylized facts for each of the panel data that represent economies with di®erent degrees
of ¯nancial frictions (corresponding to di®erent sizes of current account dispersion). This
provides us with one method of comparing the e®ect of the underlying changes (in ¯nancial
market integration) on the estimated stylized facts.
The merit of this exercise stems from the inevitable di±culty of discerning empirically
the e®ect of ongoing ¯nancial integration, or of any gradually advancing structural changes.
When the change in question stretches over the whole sample period (read four decades),
providing minuscule variation between adjacent sample years, the e®ect could be easily
swamped in data by other shocks, making it di±cult to extract from data the e®ect of
slow-evolving changes.
We start with the stationarity of current accounts, which has attracted attention partly
because it would matter for many time-series studies of open-economy models. No less
important, the stationarity of current accounts has a particular signi¯cance as the necessary
condition for the inter-temporal budget constraint to hold (Obstfeld and Taylor 2005), which
in turn would be necessary for the current account imbalances to be sustainable. The current
account series has been found to be highly persistent, at times to the point of defying
stationarity.
In our model economies, we ¯nd that the persistence of current accounts increases with
the degree of ¯nancial integration among world economies (Table 4). Compared with the
estimated persistence from the data over the 1970{2000 period, the persistence of model
economies lies between the estimates obtained from the whole sample and the advanced-
13country sample.
When we apply Dickey Fuller test to a sample corresponding to \thirty years" to test
for the unit root formally, the unit root is rejected at 5% signi¯cance level only for one out
of every six countries (to be more exact 78 cases out of 500, and 15.6% of the sample).
And the rejection rates of unit root hypothesis are higher in model economies with tighter
constraints: 27.2% in the model with a larger spread and 19.8% in the model with a smaller
(tighter) borrowing limit. In all these models and especially in the benchmark model, the
rejection of unit root is more of a rarity, when the data have been generated as a stationary
series in model economies. While this is another instance of the weak power of unit root tests
applied to a ¯nite-sized sample, it suggests that we do need to exercise caution in studying
stationarity of current accounts on the basis of data that is both ¯nite-sized (three or four
decades) and in°uenced by ongoing changes (rising ¯nancial and trade integration of world
economy).
Aside from the issue of stationarity, the persistence of current accounts provides a measure
of the speed of adjustment, namely the speed with which current account imbalances correct
themselves.17 From our model economies, we ¯nd current accounts to have larger AR(1)
coe±cients in ¯nancially more integrated economies, and will thus expect current account
imbalances to have a longer duration in ¯nancially more integrated economies. Another way
to look at this is the distribution of current account imbalances in our panel data. Table 5
reports the top and bottom 5 and 10 percent current account imbalances for our three model
economies, as well as for the data in 1970 and 2000. Model economies show rising dispersion
of current account imbalances, consistent with the often-voiced view that ¯nancial integration
leads to larger (sustainable) imbalances in current accounts. Comparing them with the data
in 1970 and 2000, there were more countries with larger de¯cits than in model economies
(fatter tails on the de¯cit side in data), raising the possibility that quite a few countries
could have been running excessive de¯cits, consistent with subsequent episodes of crisis or
sharp current account reversals.18 On the surplus side, while the 1970's data show smaller
17See Faruquee and Lee (2008) for regression evidence that the persistence varies with ¯nancial market
openness. Consistent evidence is also reported in Chinn and Wei (2008), while the paper's main focus is the
lack of correlation between the persistence and the exchange rate regime.
18Our model economies would exhibit episodes of rapid reversal of current accounts, but by construction,
based on equilibrium dynamics subject to the frictions present.
14surpluses than in model economies, the 2000's data show larger surpluses than in model
economies, lending credence to the view that some countries may be running excessively
large current account surpluses, larger than the level consistent with global equilibrium.
We now ask how close our benchmark economy is to the full international risk sharing,
which has served as the reference point and source of puzzles in the literature. In our bench-
mark economy that was calibrated to mimic the 2000 data, the equilibrium leaves a very large
distance to the ¯rst-best outcome that would prevail under complete insurance. Under full
consumption risk-sharing and without frictions in goods and ¯nancial markets, each country
would consume an equal share of the world income.19 The distribution of consumption is
less dispersed than the distribution of income, re°ecting the partial insurance, but is not
even close to being degenerate as would be the case under complete risk sharing. At the
same time, ¯nancial integration does improve risk sharing: the distribution of consumption
is less dispersed in the model economy with a higher ¯nancial integration.
Similar results follow from the comparison of the correlation of consumption growth
rates. We take thirty-year worth of simulated data, and calculate bilateral correlations
of consumption growth rates between economy 1 and the remaining 499 economies. The
mean value of correlations is 0.031, with standard deviation of 0.495.20 Compared to the
zero correlation among idiosyncratic income shocks, the positive average correlation suggests
that consumption risk sharing is at work, but at a level far from the full risk sharing which
would produce the bilateral correlation coe±cient of one. Rather, the model economy is
closer to the actual data, where the correlation among consumptions has been found to be
slightly smaller than the correlation among outputs|in our model economies, the output
correlation is zero, to which the consumption correlations are closer (though still larger) than
the value of one that would prevail under complete risk sharing.
19In our model, some dispersion can exist even under complete insurance, if some countries are constrained
by the supply of domestic goods in low-income states. In our benchmark economy, however, the (estimated)
size of relative income shocks is very small, generating virtually no countries that are constrained by the
supply of domestic goods, allowing us to use the degenerate distribution of consumption as the predicted
outcome of complete risk sharing.
20The mean correlation is a slightly lower value of 0.028 and 0.030, respectively, in the economies with a
larger spread and with a smaller (tighter) borrowing limit.
154.5. Discussion
With distinct attention on the cross-section dimension of current accounts, our paper takes
an under-explored path to understanding current account dynamics. We now elaborate on
the relationship of our approach to the related literature, which is more ample than it may
appear at the outset. We are after all calling for a multi-country equilibrium approach to the
question of current accounts that are becoming increasingly multilateral with the progress
of trade and ¯nancial integration of the world economy.
The ¯rst is the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) puzzle, which can be interpreted as saying that
the dispersion of current accounts is too small. In this paper, we provided a ¯rst pass to
this aspect of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, and tentatively concluded that the dispersion is
small compared to full risk-sharing, and that the even smaller dispersion of the past can be
explained by a model with tighter ¯nancial market frictions.21 In this regard, our results
complement those that seek the answer to the Feldstein-Horioka in ¯nancial markets.22
The importance of ¯nancial frictions in accounting for current account dispersion is con-
sistent also with a few historical studies of international ¯nancial market. As mentioned
earlier, Obstfeld and Taylor ¯nd that the dispersion of current accounts|measured as the
mean absolute value and the standard deviation of current account-to-GDP ratios of 15
countries|has been at its largest in the period leading up the First World War, which is
viewed as the period of highest ¯nancial international ¯nancial integration. Mauro, Suss-
man and Yafehand (2006) provide corroborating evidence that the sovereign debt market of
London was indeed highly liquid in the pre-war years, probably more so than today's market.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the absence of growth dynamics could be a source of
concern. We do not ¯nd this to be a major source of empirical concern. For one, our estimates
of idiosyncratic shocks are consistent with di®erent growth rates across countries. More
important, theoretical prior notwithstanding, no convincing evidence has been documented
for the international °ow of capital into developing countries (Lucas 1990), and the absence
21We do not regard the absence of physical investment to a®ect our qualitative ¯nding on the role of
¯nancial frictions, although it may in°uence the quantitative dimension because physical capital provides
a domestically-based means of alternative to wealth accumulation via net foreign assets. A model which
incorporates physical capital is in progress.
22As Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000) remark, there has been no dearth of explanation, although ¯nancial
market causes have long been suspected as an important cause. See aforementioned Bai and Zhang (2008)
for a recent quantitative study in this vein.
16itself has been attributed to ¯nancial market frictions (see Gertler and Rogo® (1990) for an
early paper). This lack of capital °ows induced by growth or convergence dynamics is not
particularly surprising in light of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, and has been con¯rmed in
several recent studies (e.g. Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill, 2004).23
The results of this paper have been obtained on the basis of the heterogeneity in income
only, while actual current accounts would be in°uenced by several other heterogeneities. In
particular, the heterogeneity in demographic trends has been much debated as the driver
of current accounts. Other drivers of current accounts include °uctuations in the terms of
trade, alternative forms of ¯nancial instruments, and investment dynamics. It is left for
future work to incorporate these factors into a similar multi-country equilibrium analysis of
current accounts, and we are making progress with incorporating investment dynamics.
5. Conclusion
We develop and explore a simple multi-country model of the global distribution of current
account balances. In the face of incomplete markets, countries accumulate foreign assets to
provide for rainy days, in an e®ort of self-insurance. Combined with the diversity in shocks
to each country's income, this insurance motive leads countries to display a well-de¯ned
distribution of current account surpluses and de¯cits.
The bulk of current account dispersion can be explained by our model calibrated with
standard parameter values. We ¯nd that tighter frictions in ¯nancial or trade transactions
tend to narrow the dispersion of current accounts, o®ering an explanation of the smaller
dispersion in the past. In particular, the ¯nancial frictions have a substantial e®ect on the
dispersion, greater than the trade frictions.
To distill time-series implications of the changing global dispersion (or ¯nancial inte-
gration), we use simulated data to estimate several standard empirical relationships. The
current account series is found to have a high persistence. And often the unit root hypothe-
sis cannot be rejected, even when the simulated data were generated in a stationary model.
The simulated data are also found to leave a large distance to a complete consumption risk
sharing.
23Some papers even claimed that capital °ows in the reverse direction, from rich to poor countries or from
high-productivity to low-productivity countries. See Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) and references therein.
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20A. Data Appendix
A.1. National Incomes
The National Income Accounts (NIA) data are from the Penn World Table Version 6.2
(2006), PWT memnonics are in parenthesis. The PWT provides two types of price and
quantity indices: (1) `current price' estimates based on Geary aggregation of international
current prices for each year, and (2) `constant price' estimates based on Geary aggregation
of international current prices for benchmark years and interpolation of country-speci¯c
constant price NIA data for in between years. For most of our work we use the `constant
price' data. Output, y, is real per capita GDP at constant prices constructed as a Laspeyre
index (RGDPL). The list of countries we consider are as follows.
Asia: Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Philip-
pines, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Fiji, Nepal, Pakistan.
Europe: Portugal, Norway, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain,
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, Iceland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ireland.
America: U.S.A., Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad & Tobago, Peru, Barbados, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala.
Africa and Middle Eastern: Egypt, Israel, Botswana, South Africa, Tunisia, Mali, Malawi,
Swaziland, Iran, Syria.
A.2. Current Accounts
Current account, trade balance, and GDP data are obtained from the from the various
issues of the International Financial Statistics and the World Economic Outlook database.
Net foreign assets data are are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) data set for 1970|2004
period, and obtained by backward adjustment (also earlier working data) for the 1960s.
Advanced countries used in ¯gures comprise: U.S.A., United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Australia, New Zealand.
21Table 1: Distributions of Current Account, Net Foreign Asset, and Trade Balance
1970 2000
CA

















Note: See Appendix for the detailed description of data sources.
22Table 2: Parameters of the Benchmark Model Economy
Parameter Description
¯ = 0:96 Discount factor
° = 2 Relative risk aversion
´ = 6 Substitution elast b/w domestic and foreign consumption
Á = 0:475 Weight on domestic goods in CES utility function
¿ = 0:5 Trade friction
Ã = rB ¡ rL = 1:5% Interest rate spread
¹ a = ¡1:5 Borrowing constraint
½x = 0:863 Persistence of relative income shock
¾x = 0:0495 Standard deviation of innovation to relative income
23Table 3: Standard Deviations of Current Account, Net Foreign Asset, and Trade Balance
Data Model Economies
Trade Borrowing 1970 2000 Benchmark Friction Constraint Spread
¿ = 0:7 ¹ a = ¡0:5 Ã = 3%
CA
GDP 4.9 6.8 5.0 4.9 4.0 3.3
NFA
GDP 29.3 55.4 55.4 55.2 34.4 25.0
TB
GDP 9.8 11.6 5.6 5.5 4.3 3.5
Note: See Appendix for the detailed description of data sources.
24Table 4: Persistence of Current Account, Net Foreign Asset, and Trade Balance
Data Model Economies
Advanced Borrowing All Countries Benchmark Constraint Spread
¹ a = ¡0:5 Ã = 3%
CA
GDP 0.64 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.75
NFA
GDP 0.85 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.99
TB
GDP 0.70 0.89 0.83 0.80 0.77
Note: See Appendix for the detailed description of data sources.
25Table 5: Distribution of Current Account
Data Model Economies
Borrowing Percentile 1970 2000 Benchmark Constraint Spread
¹ a = ¡0:5 Ã = 3%
5% -10.0 -10.3 -8.5 -6.9 -5.5
10% -6.8 -7.6 -6.4 -5.2 -3.9
50% -1.9 -2.5 0.0 0.1 0.0
90% 1.0 9.9 6.1 4.9 4.0
95% 2.7 13.1 7.9 6.3 5.4
Note: See Appendix for the detailed description of data sources.
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29Figure 4: Stationary Distribution of Benchmark Economy
30Figure 5: Stationary Distribution of Benchmark Economy
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31Figure 6: Model Comparison: Current Account / GDP














Note: The benchmark model is based on ¿ = 0:5, ¹ a = ¡1:5, and Ã = 1:5%; 'trade friction' refers
to the model with a larger trade friction ¿ = 0:7; 'borrow constraint' refers to ¹ a = ¡0:5; 'spread'
refers to Ã = 3%.
32